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One of the most important decisions we make in our careers concerns the criteria we
rely on to evaluate knowledge claims. The criteria we use influence selection of questions
(theories) to explore (e.g., those that can be falsified), research methods to use (e.g., those
that rigorously test guesses) and speaking and writing styles (e.g., clear). We could, for
example, choose scientific criteria or rely on authority or popularity as a guide. Misinformed
discussions of "different ways of knowing" abound in the social work literature (and in
psychology as well) and many graduates of doctoral programs to whom I have spoken,
including those from Berkeley, are quite ignorant about the philosophy of science. They
confuse science with logical positivism, scientism, and pseudoscience, and, in so doing,
misinform rather than inform those whom they teach. They embrace a justification approach
to knowledge that encourages inflated claims of what is known and gets in the way of
discarding unpromising directions.
Another reason for selecting this topic concerns related ethical issues. Our concern for
helping and not harming clients obliges us to critically examine the criteria we use to evaluate
knowledge claims. Theories (e.g., about "what works") are conjectures about what may
be true. We always have theories. "There is no pure, disinterested, theory-free observation"
(Popper, 1994, p. 8). Because our theories influence our decisions, they are important to
examine. Karl Popper (1994) defines truth as the correspondence of statements with facts. If
a professor says assertive community outreach has been shown to be helpful, he should base
this statement on critical tests of this claim, including evidence regarding the acceptability of
the program to all involved participants (Baer, 1988; Schwartz & Baer, 1989). If we rely on
questionable criteria for evaluating knowledge claims, clients may be harmed rather than
helped, false hope may be created, harmful side effects experienced, and effective methods ('"
foregone (see, for example, O'Donohue& Szymanski, 1994; Skrabanek & McCormick,
1992). The history of the helping profession clearly shows that good intentions will not
protect clients from harm. Consider the history of institutionalized psychiatry (Szasz, 1994;
Valenstein, 1986). Consider also harms done by overzealous advocates of repressed memories
(Ofshe & Watters, 1994). Consider the results of accepting claims of effectiveness regarding
facilitated communication based on qualitative data (e.g., anecdotal case reports) that were
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later shown to be false based on controlled research findings (Jacobson, Mulick, Schwarti,
1995). The findings of experimental, in contrast to qualitative, studies of the effects of
facilitated communication (a method alleged to help nonverbal people talk) "have been
consistently negative indicating that FC is neither reliably replicable nor valid when produced"
(p. 754). These controlled studies showed that the communication alleged to be from
previously nonverbal people was actually determined by the facilitators. Margolin (1997)
argues that social workers mystify their clients and are themselves mystified about their main
roles and aims (judging, evaluating, and classifying clients rather than helping them).
It is astonishing that all doctoral students (and those at other educational levels as well)
are not required to take a course in the philosophy of science given its relevance both to
research and practice. This would highlight the clash berween science and authoritarianism as
competing criteria on which to base knowledge claims. It would help students to distinguish
berween science and pseudoscience and quackery and to spot and counter propaganda. We are
all philosophers in that we make scores of decisions every day. Social workers make decisions
that affect other people's lives, making it incumbent on them to make well reasoned decisions
and help their clients do so as well.
All men and all women are philosophers. If they are not conscious of having
philosophical problems, they have, at any rate, philosophical prejudices. Most of these
are theories which they take for granted: they have absorbed them from their
intellectual environment or from tradition. Since few of these theories are consciously
held, they are prejudices in the sense that they are held without critical examination,
even though they may be of great importance for the practical actions of people, and
for their whole life. (Popper, 1992, p. 179).
The question, "What is knowledge?" has been of concern to philosophers throughout the ages.
Raymond Nickerson (1986) defines knowledge as information that decreases uncertainty about
how to attain a certain outcome. This definition seems especially pertinent to the professions.
Given this definition, we can ask how can knowledge be gained? What knowledge will help us
to solve problems clients confront (e.g., elder abuse, a need for reliable respite care)? How
can we avoid fooling ourselves that we have it when we don't? What values, knowledge, and
skills will maximize the likelihood of knowledge development and diffusion and what
educational formats are most likely to contribute to this? We can examine the degree to which
educational programs provide learning and teaching conditions that maximize the outcomes
that are sought and promised. We can examine the extent to which they provide relevant
content and performance knowledge that contribute to helping clients and avoiding harm, and
also the extent to which they decrease irrelevant and false knowledge.
Different ways of knowing differ in the extent to which they highlight uncertainty and
are designed to weed out biases and distortions that may influence assumptions. Certain "ways
of knowing" compared to others are designed to rigorously test guesses (e.g., about
effectiveness). The very purpose of experimental studies and certain kinds of single-case
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designs is to avoid unwarranted assumptions about effects. (Whether they offer information
about the role of methods used'in the reported effects depends on the particular design used.)
Karl Popper suggests that we do not know more today than we did thousands of years ago
because solving some problems creates new ones. For example, medical advances have
created new problems such as over population.
There is no agreement on "one way of knowing" in social work and it is certainly OOJ;
scientific reasoning that is accepted, as can be seen by examining the literature in social work
on "different ways of knowing." Quite the opposite. In reviews of research published in five
social work journals, Glisson (1990) found that the majority of studies (63 percent) used
surveys without probability sampling. Only a small percentage involved single case (1.9
percent) or experimental studies (4.6 percent). Fraser and his colleagues (1994) reported
similar findings in a review of 10 journals between 1985 and 1988. Fewer than half of all
articles reviewed were research based, and fewer than six percent of these used an
experimental design. Most studies relied on percentages and simple counts. Fewer than half
of the surveys used multivariate statistical methods. Fraser and his colleagues (1994)
concluded that "the core social work literature contains little rigorous research from either a
quantitative or qualitative point-of-view" (p. 253). Antiscience is common (perhaps most
common) in academic settings (Patai & Koertge, 1994). Many people confuse science,
scienticism, and pseudoscience, resulting in an antiscience stance. Some argue that nothing
can be known "for sure.· (This is assumed in science.) Relativists argue that all methods are
equally valid in testing claims (e.g., anecdotal reports and experimental studies). Typically,
such views are offered unrelated to a specific real-life problem and a critical appraisal of the
results of competing views in minimizing the problem. That is, discussions are not problem
focused. Some argue that because we know nothing for sure, we really know nothing. We
should follow out the logic of each position. Can you walk through walls or jump from high
windows without harm? If we know nothing, then what is the rationale for professional
education? The clear success of scientific methods in hundreds of areas shows that all
methods are not equally effective in testing knowledge claims.
Munz (1985) argues that "there are many pieces of knowledge held consciously which
have very little direct bearing on physical survival." (p. 74). He defines false knowledge as
beliefs that are not true and that are not questioned. Such beliefs "can be held or discarded
regardless of the environment in which people who hold them are living. Nevertheless, they
are frequently used for a very useful function. They are used as a social bond so that societies
can be formed with defined members and these societies can survive because the defined
membership makes cooperation and division of labor possible" (p. 74). In this kind of
society, membership depends on being able to give correct answers to a catechism; beliefs "are 'j'
not available for criticism and therefore cannot be examined. They are held dogmatically.
Such dogmatism should, however, not blind us to that the fact that it performs a very useful
and essential function in keeping the society together." (I'. 74). "In catechismic societies,
people practice cognitive mercantilism and thus exempt knowledge from the pressures of a free
market" (p. 75). In these kind of societies "certain axioms, values, sentiments and beliefs
remain impervious to experience and indifferent to contradiction. " (I'. 75). "It follows,
therefore, that only in societies where the social order is non-catechismic (Le., cognitively
neutral) can beliefs and theories be examined critically" (p. 75). The growth of knowledge
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depends on the possibility of trial and error which "depends on the presence of alternative
theories which, if the old ones do not pass the trial, can be substituted .and, in turn, subjected
to further trial and error. " (p. 76).
Questionable Criteria
Questionable criteria on which to base knowledge claims include authority, popularity,
testimonials, newness, tradition, experience and intuition (see Figure I). These criteria do not
provide critical tests of claims, often because they consider only part of the picture (e.g., only
examples that support a belief). Consider authority. An example is citing a famous person to
support a claim. The source of this fallacy is the mistaken assumption that status is correlated
with accuracy. History shows that authority is not a sound guide about what is accurate. Nor
do popularity or consensus provide sound guides (basing beliefs or actions on what most
people accept). A researcher may adopt qualitative methods to test claims about service
effectiveness because many other researchers use these methods. Reliance on popularity is
similar to relying on consensus (what most people believe). But what most people believe may
not be correct. Thousands of dollars have been spent at Berkeley to identify social work
competencies based on consensus, a notoriously poor guide to what is true and what is false.
Nor do tradition (what's been done in the past) or newness (the latest method) provide
sound guides. Simply because something ·is new or innovative does not mean it is effective.
After all, everything was new at some time. Other questionable criteria on which to base
claims include manner of presentation (e. g., the confidence with which a claim is presented)
and appeals to good intentions. Good intentions and helping clients do not necessarily go
together as the history of the professions shows. Nor does what "makes sense" provide a
sound guide. The history of science shows that great ideas often fly in the face of "common
sense." In the case example fallacy, conclusions about many clients are made based on a few
unrepresentative examples. This involves faulty generalization; what may be true in a few
cases may not be at all true of many other cases. Cases that 'prove the point" can always be
found. Reliance on testimonials (reports on the part of people who have used a product or
service that the product or service is effective) is a variant of the case example fallacy and is
subject to the limitations of case examples in offering evidence for a claim. The problem with
testimonials is not that the report about an individual's personal experience with a given
method is not accurate, but the further step of making a claim that this experience means that
the method works.
The key problem in relying on experience as a guide to what is accurate is the lack of
comparison (Dawes, 1988). Our experience is often restricted and biased. A child welfare
worker may assume that few child abusers stop abusing their children because she sees those
who do not stop abusing their children (Dawes, 1989). Her experiences with this biased
sample results in incorrect inferences about the reoccurrence of child abuse (Le., an
overestimate). We tend to recall our successes and forget our failures. Unless we have kept '.,'
track of both our hits and our misses we may arrive at quite inaccurate beliefs. A further
problem in relying on experience concerns the biased nature of our memory for what
happened. Chalmers (1983) notes that "the ability of medical students to assess the quality of
4
evidence used to support authoritative claims actually deteriorates as they come into increasing
contact with clinical teachers" (Obstetrical Practices in the United States, 1978, p. 30). Is this
true in social work? Has anyone cared enough to find out?
Intuition is another criterion used to evaluate the accuracy of claims. Jonathan Baron
(1994) defines intuition as "an unanalyzed and unjustified belief" (p. 26) and argues that
beliefs based on intuition may be sound or unsound and suggests that bel:ause of this, basing
beliefs on intuition may result in consequences that harm people. Although both intuition and
experience provide valuable sources for ideas about what may be true, they do not provide a
sound guide about their accuracy. Over 100 studies show that predictions based on relevant
statistical data that integrate information from a variety of sources are more accurate than
predictions based on intuition. Predictions based on intuition are likely to be inconsistent
(Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989).
What about Postmodernism?
Some social workers have become enamored with postmodernism, a current form of
relativism. It is assumed that knowledge and morality are inherently bounded by or rooted in
culture (Gellner, 1992, p. 68). "Knowledge or morality outside of culture is, it claims, a
chimera.... Meanings are incommensurate, meanings are culturally constructed, and so all
cultures are equal... " (p. 73). In his brilliant book Postmodernjsm reason and religjon,
Ernest Gellner argues that this view is an affectation: "Those who propound it, or defend it
against its critics, continue, whenever facing any serious issue in which their real interests are
engaged, to act on the non-relativistic assumption that one particular vision is cognitively much
more effective than others" (p. 70). Consider for example the different criteria social workers
want their physicians to rely on when confronted with a serious medical problem compared to
criteria they say they rely on to select service methods offered to clients. They rely on
intuition, testimonials, and case examples when making decisions about their clients but want
their physicians to rely on the results of controlled experimental studies and demonstrated track
record of success based on data collected systematically and regularly when making decisions
about a serious medical problem of their own (Gambrill, 1996). Shouldn't what's good for the
goose be good for the gander? Is there hypocrisy here?
Gellner argues that the sole focus on cognitive meaning ignores political and economic
influences. He argues that postmodernism "denies or obscures tremendous differences in
cognition and technical power, differences which are crucial for the understanding of current
developments of human society" (pp. 71-72). He points out that there are real constraints in
society which are obscured within this recent form of relativism and suggests that such
cognitive nihilism constitutes a "travesty of the real role of serious knowledge in our lives" (p.
95). Gellner argues that this view undervalues coercive and economic constraints in society
and overvalues conceptual ones; "hermeneutists do not seem to be very interested in political
"'"-_A
and economic structures: it is domination by symbols and discourse which really secures and
retains their attention" (p. 63). As he notes, concepts do constrain. "What is J1Qt obvious is
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figure I:
Qpeujooabl© Cri.tex:ill fur Evaluating Knowledge Claims
Criteria
l) Authority (what do the "experts" lillY'?)
l) Popularity (argument ad populum)
o Experience
o Traditioll
o What's new
o Case examples
l) Testimonials
() Characteristics of the person
(ad hominem)
o Good intentions
o What makes seme
o Intuition
o Entertainment value
Example
"If freud said it, it must be true. "
"Eighty percent of social workers
use ...• It has to be sound. "
'She was very convincing. Her
results must be true. W
MI have worked with clients like this
for ten years. W
"That's what our social service agencies
provide to clients. »
"It's the latest method. We should
use it too. "
Accepting claims based on vague undocumented
evidence.
"I lise narrative therapy with my clients
and they improve dramatically."
MIt works. I tried it!»
'She graduated from Ohio State University. »
'We care about our clients. n (Said in response to
a question about service effectiveness.)
The reasoning behind bioenergetics makes sense. »
MI trust my feelings when deciding what
helps clients. W
Mj really enjoy using this research method."
'-,
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just how important a part conceptual constraint plays, when compared with political or
economic pressures" (p. 63). Gellner argues that the relative role of meanings and external
facts (economic and political contingencies) is obscured. "If we live in a world of meanings,
and meanings exhaust the world, where is there any room for coercion through the whip, gun,
or hunger?" (p. 63). He argues that the claim that there are no objective facts is simply false.
"You cannot investigate idiosyncratic meanings without placing them in the context of nature 3S
seen by our scientific culture, and, in particular, in the context of the shocking inequalities of
power of diverse cognitive styles" (p. 69). It is ironic that a view giving so little attention to
economic and political power is so warmly embraced in a profession allegedly devoted to
decreasing inequalities in living conditions. Some would argue that conceptual views follow
(rather than precede) political and economic contingencies. (For other critiques of
postmodernism see, for example, Mum:, 1987; 1992.)
There are many payoffs for embracing relativism. It frees one from evaluation both by
self and others. It frees one to be obscure. It frees one to pursue political and economic power
while denying this pursuit.
Misunderstandings and Misrepresentations of Science
Surveys show that most people do not understand the basic characteristics of science
(Miller, (987). Misconceptions about science include the following:
o There is a search for final answers.
o Intuitive thinking has no role.
o It is assumed that science knows or will soon know all the answers.
o Objectivity is assumed.
o Chance occurrences are not considered.
o Scientific knowledge is equivalent to scientific thinking.
o The accumulation of facts is the primary goal.
o Linear thinking is required.
o Passion and caring have no role.
o There is one kind of scientific method.
o Unobservable events are not considered.
Discussions of science in social work journals often misrepresent what science is and what it is
not, confusing it with naive empiricism, logical positivism, essentialism, and pseudoscience.
As Phillips (1987) remarks, many who write about the philosophy of science have not done
their homework (see also Phillips, 1992). Some writers equate rigor with rigor mortis. It is
assumed that careful exploration of claims and beliefs requires a distortion of events studied and
produces data of little value. Rigor does not have to result in rigor mortis (Le., data of little
value in decreasing uncertainty about questions posed), as well shown by the problems
addressed by scientific methods. Systematic inquiry and the discovery of practice knowledge
does not require the use of complex statistics (see for example, Journal of Al2lllied Behayior
Analysis).
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Misunderstandings about science may result in ignoring this problem-solving method
and the knowledge it has generated to help clients to enhance the quality of their lives.
Misunderstandings and misrepresentations of science are so common that D. C. Phillips, a
philosopher of science, titled his latest book The social scientjst's bestjary: A guide to fabirA
threats to and defenses of naturalistic social science (1992). Academics often confuse logical
positivism (discarded by scientists long ago) and science as we know it today and do not
distinguish between justification and fallibilistic evolutionary approaches to knowledge (critical
rationalism). Science is often misrepresented as a collection of facts or as referring only to
controlled experimental studies. Some protest that science is misused. Anything can be
misused, including social work serviCes. Some believe that critical reflection is incompatible
with passionate caring. Reading the written material of any number of scientists including
Albert Einstein, Loren Eiseley, Karl Popper, and Carl Sagan would quickly put this false belief
to rest.
Far from reinforcing myths about reality as some suggest (e.g., Karger, 1983, p. 204),
science is likely to question them. This is one reason fear of science is as old as science itself
(White, 1896). Science emphasizes uncertainty. Authoritarianism specializes in
pronouncements of what is true and what is false. The history of science and medicine shows
that the results of experimental research involving systematic investigation often free us from
false beliefs that harm rather than help and decrease our susceptibility to fraudulent claims.
Science is conservative in insisting that a new theory account for previous findings. (For
critiques of the view that advances require the abandonment of prior knowledge, see Phillips,
1987.) It is revolutionary in calling for the overthrow of previous theories shown to be false.
That does not mean that the new theory has been established as true. Many scientific
discoveries, such as Darwin's theory of evolution, clash with religious views of the world.
Consider also the Church's reactions to the discovery that the earth was not the center of the
universe; only after 350 years did the Catholic Church agree that Galileo was correct in
believing that the earth revolves around the sun. All sorts of questions that people may not
want raised may be raised, such as: Does this residential center really help residents? Would
another method be more effective? Are my methods really helpful to clients? How accurate is
my belief about ? Does this research method critically test this claim? Am I making
inflated claims of knowledge based on this research?
Instructors and students who are misinformed about what science is and what it is not in
turn miseducate others, including clients, and will not be able to fulfill their professional
obligation to fully inform clients (e.g., about what service methods have been critically tested
to what effect). Miseducated students will not be able to distinguish science from
pseudoscience and so will not be able to help their clients to do so. No wonder so many social
workers fall for human service advertisements and uncritically embrace the latest fad.
Misinforming students occurs even in research courses. For example, a graduate of our own
doctoral program who teaches research to masters students recently dismissed science as a way
to discover and try to solve problems because "it was linear. " This is incorrect, but, even if it
were correct, if a linear approach yields solutions to clients' concerns, who cares? An accurate
understanding of science will help you to distinguish between helpful, trivializing, and bogus
uses. Bogus uses may create and maintain views of problems and proposed solutions that leave
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unchanged or decrease the quality of life for clients. Clients may be said to be empowered
when in fact their options have narrowed.
What is Science?
Science is a way of thinking about and investigating the accuracy of assumptions about
the world. It is a process for solving problems in which we learn from our mistakes. Science
rejects reliance on authority (e.g., pronouncements by high placed officials or professors) as a
route to knowledge. Science and authority are clashing approaches to knowledge claims
(White, 1993). There are many ways to do science and many philosophies of science. The
terms "science' and •scientific" are sometimes used to refer to any systematic effort to acquire
information about a subject, including case studies, correlational studies, and naturalistic
studies. Each of these methods is subject to certain kinds of error which must be considered in
evaluating data they generate. Non-experimental approaches to understanding include natural
observation as in ethology (the study of animal behavior in real-life settings) as well as
correlational methods that use statistical analysis to investigate the degree to which events are
associated. These methods are of value in suggesting promising experiments as well as when
events of interest cannot be experimentally altered or if doing so would destroy what is under
investigation. Scientific methods are explicitly designed to try to rule out biases. It is well
accepted in science that some things cannot be studied without altering them.
The view of science presented here, critical rationalism, is one in which the
theory-laden nature of observation is assumed (our assumptions influence what we observe) and
rational criticism is viewed as the essence of science (Miller, 1994; Popper, 1972; Phillips,
1987, 1992). Popper's view of science is summed up in four steps: 1) we select a problem; 2)
we try to solve it by proposing a theory as a guess about what may be true; 3) we critically
discuss and test our theory; and 4) which always reveals new problems. Creative bold guesses
about what may be true are essential to the development of knowledge, especially those that are
refutable--you can find out if they are false. This view of science emphasizes error-elimination
through criticism: "knowledge grows by the elimination of some of our errors, and in this way
we learn to understand our problems, and our theories, and the need for new solutions'
(Popper, 1994, p. 159). Concepts are assumed to have meaning and value even though they are
unobservable. The growth of knowledge can be viewed in its evolutionary perspective as
problem solving (Munz, 1985; Popper, 1972; Radnitsky & Bartley, 1987). By testing our
guesses we eliminate false theories and learn a bit more about our problems. Corrective
feedback from the physical world allows us to test our guesses about what is true or false. We
learn which of our guesses are false. Evolutionary epistemologists highlight the two different
histories of science: the creation of theories (e.g., through random variation) and their selection
(by testing) (Munz, 1985).
Scientific Statements Are RefutableITestable
The scientific tradition is a tradition of criticism (Popper, 1994, p. 42). The essence of
science is creative, bold guessing and rigorous testing in a way that offers accurate information
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about whether a guess (conjecture or theory) is correct (Asimov, 1989). Scientific statements
are those that are testable (they can be refuted). Consider the question "how many teeth are in
a horse's mouth?" You could speculate about this, or you could open a horse's mouth and look
inside. If an agency for the homeless claims that it succeeds in finding homes for applicants
within ten days, you could accept this claim at face value or gather data systematically to see if
this claim is true. Science deals with specific problems that are solvable (that have potential to
be answered given available methods of empirical inquiry). Examples are: "Is intensive
in-home care for parents of abused children more effective than the usual social work
services?" "Is use of medication to decrease depression in elderly people more (or less)
effective than cognitive-behavioral methods?" Examples of unsolvable questions include:
·Should punishment ever be used in raising children?" and'Are people inherently good or
evil?' Saying that science deals with problems that are solvable does not mean that other kinds
of questions are unimportant or that a problem will remain unsolvable. New methods may be
developed that allow pursuit of questions previously unapproachable in a systematic way.
Popper argues that "the growth of knowledge, and especially of scientific knowledge, consists
of learning from our mistakes' (p. 93). It is assumed that we can discover approximations to
the truth by rational argument and critical testing of theories and that the soundness of an
assertion is related to the uniqueness and rigor of related critical tests.
A theory should describe what cannot occur as well as what will occur. Theories can
only be falsified if specific predictions are made not only about what l&!l happen, but what
cannot happen. If you can make contradictory predictions based on a theory, it is not testable.
If you cannot discover a way to test a theory, it is not falsifiable. Testing may involve
examining the past as in Darwin's theory of evolution. Some theories are not testable
(falsifiable). There is no way to test them to find out if they are correct. For instance,
psychoanalytic theory is often criticized on the grounds that it is not falsifiable--that
contradictory hypotheses can be drawn from the theory. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a
theory but a vice.
Justification ys. Falsification. In a justificationist approach to knowledge development
there is a focus on gathering support for (justifying, validating, confirming) claims and
theories. Karl Popper argues that we cannot discover what is true by induction (generalizing
from the particular to the general) because we may later discover exceptions. Let's say that
you see 3,000 swans and they are all white. Does this mean that all swans are white? Can we
generalize from the particular (seeing 3,000 swans all of which are white) to the general" All
swans are white." In fact, black swans are found in New Zealand. Popper argues that
falsification (attempts to falsify, to discover the errors in our beliefs) via critical discussion and
testing is the only sound way to develop knowledge (Popper, 1992; 1994). Confirmations of a
theory can readily be found if one looks for them. Popper uses the criteria of falsifiability to
demark what is or could be scientific knowledge from what is not or could not be. For
example there is no way to refute the claim "There is a God." There is a way to refute the
claim"Assertive community outreach services for the severely mentally ill reduces substance
abuse." We could, for example, randomly distribute clients to two different groups, one of
which provides such services, and compare outcomes.
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Theories (guesses about what may be true) differ in the extent to which they have been
tested and in the rigor of the tests used. Although selection of a~ can be justified by it
having survived more risky tests concerning a wider variety of hypotheses (not been falsified)
compared to other theories that have not been tested or that have been falsified, it can never
accurately be claimed to be "the truth." We can only eliminate false beliefs. "For trial-and-
error testing one needs the presence of alternative theories" (Munz, 1985, p. 75). In social
systems that focus on social bonding, alternatives can't be entertained and so knowledge cannot
grow. "In this way, the progression of scientific knowledge is accidentally related to social
systems" (p. 75). Munz (1985) argues that the conditions in which knowledge can grow are
historically quite rare. Societies in which knowledge can grow are held together by a "shared
practice of criticism, not by a particular belief; not even by the belief that one ought to practice
criticism. The practice of radical criticism is not based on the belief that radical criticism is
'right.' If it were, one would call such practice a commitment to a belief which, in rum,
cannot be criticized. There is, however, no such commitment. Radical criticism is the simple
operation of reason. While reason is not a substantive force which can tell us what is the right
thing to do, it is self-sustaining or supporting; for it would simply be against reason to accept
any knowledge without criticizing it" (pp. 84-85) (see also Bartley, 1984). Munz argues that
the error of the sociologists of knowledge was to insist that there is a particular correct method
for the pursuit of knowledge. He argues that "knowledge is not acquired by the pursuit of a
'correct method'; rather it is what is left standing when criticism has been exhausted" (p. 72).
He points out that sociologists of knowledge refuse to accept this answer and "have continued
to think that if there is knowledge, it must be the result of a 'correct' method of getting it" (p.
72). Munz suggests that sociology makes a very important contribution to our knowledge of
the growth of knowledge. "Its contribution does not consist in the substantive explanation of
how the content of knowledge is determined sociologically, but in a negative explanation of
why knowledge is rare and intermittent and why it needs very special conditions in which it can
grow" (pp. 73-74). Its great contribution lies in emphasizing the social bonding functions of
false knowledge.
Some Tests are More Rigorous Than Others
Some tests provide a more rigorous test than others and so offer more information about
what may be true or false. Experimental tests are more severe tests of claims compared to
anecdotal reports. Unlike anecdotal reports, they are carefully designed to rule out alternative
hypotheses about what may be true and so provide more opportunities to discover that a theory
is not correct. Calling a study qualitative does not magically remove potential sources of bias
that may gravely limit the accuracy of claims. Interviewers and observers are subject to a
variety of biases that may distort what is seen or change what occurs. Phillips (1990) argues
that qualitative researchers underestimate the potential for bias and error in their work,
especially when making causal assumptions. Making accurate predictions (e.g., about what
service methods will help a client) is more difficult than offering after the fact (ad hoc)
accounts that may sound plausible (even profound), but provide no service guidelines. Dawes
(1995) argues that the accuracy of predictions about behavior based on a new method should be
better than what is possible by the use of benchmark indicators (e.g., past behavior as a
predictor of future behavior). The question raised will suggest the research method required to
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explore it. Every research method is limited in the kinds of questions it can successfully
address. Purpose will suggest the kinds of evidence needed to test different claims. If our
purpose is to communicate the emotional complexity of an experience such as the death of an
infant, then qualitative methods may be needed (for example, detailed case examples, thematic
analyses of journal entries, or open-ended interviews at different times [Gambrill, 1995].
A Search for Patterns and Regularities
It is assumed that the universe has some degree of order and consistency. This does not
mean that unexplained phenomenon or chance variations are not considered. For example,
chance variations contribute to evolutionary changes (Lewontin, 1994). Uncertainty is
assumed. Since a future test may reveal a belief to be incorrect, even one that is strongly
corroborated (has survived many critical tests), no assertion can ever be proven (Popper,
1972). This does not mean that all beliefs are equally sound; some have survived more
rigorous tests than others (Asimov, 1989).
Parsimony
An explanation is parsimonious if most components are required for explaining most
related phenomenon. Unnecessarily complex explanations may get in the way of detecting
relationships between behaviors and related events.
Scientjsts Strive for O!:tiectivity
Basic to objectivity is the critical discussion of theories (error elimination through
criticism). The theory-laden nature of observation is assumed. "What we call scientific
o!:tiectivity is nothing else than the fact that no scientific theory is accepted as a dogma, and that
all theories are tentative and are open all the time to severe criticism--to a rational critical
discussion aiming at the elimination of errors· (Popper, 1994, p. 160). Scientists are often
wrong and find out that they are wrong by testing their predictions. Better theories (those that
can account for more findings) replace earlier ones. Although the purpose of science is to seek
true answers to problems (statements that correspond to the facts) this does not mean that there
is certain knowledge. Rather, we may say that certain beliefs (theories) have (so far) survived
critical tests or have not yet been exposed to them. And some have been found to be false (see
for example Enkin, et. a\., 1995). An error ·consists essentially in our regarding as true a
theory that is not true· (Popper, 1992, p. 4). We can avoid error or discover it by doing
"everything possible to discover and eliminate falsehoods" (p. 4). For example, we can
actively search for mistakes to increase the likelihood of preventing them in the future and so
improve the quality of service provided to cl ients (Mcintyre & Popper, 1983).
A Skeptical Attitude
Scientists are skeptics. They question what others view as fact or ·common sense.·
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Science.. .isa way of thinking... [It] invites us to let the facts in, even when they don't
conform to our preconceptions. It counsels us to consider hypotheses in our heads and
see which ones best match the facts. It urges on us a fine balance between
no-holds-barred openness to new ideas, however heretical, and the most rigorous
. skeptical scrutiny of everything--new ideas and established wisdom (Sagan, 1990, p.
265).
Scientists and skeptics seek criticism of their views and change their beliefs (when they have
good reason to do so). Skeptics are more interested in arriving at accurate answers than in not
ruffling the feathers of supervisors or administrators.
Other Characteristics
Scientific knowledge is publ iel>, reviewed by a community. Science is collective.
Scientists communicate with one another and the results of one study inform the efforts of other
scientists. Carl Sagan (1995) emphasizes the importance of an "aptitude for wonder." Without
this you may have little interest in staying with a problem and trying to learn more about it
because you find it fascinating. You have to be among "the whole corp of thought-divers, that
have been diving & coming up again with blood-shot eyes since the world began" (Melville,
1849). Some academics I have met give a wan, knowing smile and say, "Yes, I know" when
confronted with new discoveries or theories. I have always found this amazing. It reflects a
lack of wonder, curiosity and interest in solving problems and an overestimation of knowledge
that is on quite a grand scale. Persistence and a capacity for hard work are also needed.
Barzun (1950) suggests that despite unfavorable environments, some people manage to continue
to nourish a passionate search for knowledge. In this same essay he emphasizes the enormous
contributions to be gained from the thoughtful minds that have gone before. "For the educated
person has appropriated so much of other men's minds that he can live on his store like the
camel on his reservoir" (p. 216). We can travel mentally as well as physically and, like
physical travel, we can choose poorly or wisely in relation to the rewards we reap.
pseudoscience
The term "pseudoscience" refers to material that makes science-like claims but provides
no evidence for them (Bunge, 1985; Gray, 1991; Tavris, 1994). Hallmarks of pseudoscience
include the following:
o critical examination of claims/arguments is discouraged
o the trappings of science are used without the substance
o reliance on anecdotal evidence
o not self-correcting
o unskeptical
o equates an open mind with an uncritical one
o falsifying data are ignored or explained away
o relies on vague language
o not empirical
o produces beliefs and faith but not knowledge
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o often not testable
o does not require repeatability
Proselytizers of many sorts cast their advice as based on science. They use the ideology and
"trappings" of science to pull the wool over our eyes in suggesting critical tests of claims that
do not exist. Advertisers, both past and present, use the trappings of science (without the
substance) to encourage consumers to buy products. Relying on pseudoscientific methods to
inflate and promote claims is a common propaganda method in the professions. Classification
of clients into psychiatric categories lends an aura of scientific credibility to this practice,
whether or not there is any evidence that such a practice is warranted or that it is helpful to
clients (Boyle, 1990; Kirk & Kutehins, 1992; Szasz, 1987; 1994). Pseudoscience is
characterized by a causal approach to evidence (weak evidence is accepted as readily as strong
evidence). A critical attitude, which Karl Popper defines as a willingness and commitment to
open up favored views to severe scrutiny, is basic to science, distinguishing it from
pseudoscience. By contrast, pseudoscience may offer irrefutable hypotheses and be reluctant to
revise beliefs even when confronted with relevant criticism. It makes excessive (unsupported)
claims of contributions to knowledge.
Pseudoscience is a billion dollar industry. Products include self-help books,
"subliminal" tapes, and call-in psychic advice from "authentic psychics," which have no
evidence that they accomplish what they promise (Druckman & Bjork. 1991). Pseudoscience
can be found in all fields including multiculturalism (see for example; Oritz De Montellano,
1992). The terms "science" and "scientific" are often used as adjectives to enhance the
credibility of a view or approach even though no evidence is provided to support the view. The
term "science" has been applied to many activities in social work that in reality have nothing to
do with science. Examples include "scientific charity' and scientific philanthropy.
Quackery
Quackery refers to the promotion and marketing either by professionals or others for a
profit of untested, often worthless, and sometimes dangerous health products and procedures
(Jarvis, 1990; Pepper, 1984; Young, 1992). For every claim based on sound evidence, we
encounter scores of bogus claims in advertisements, newscasts, films, TV, newspapers, and
professional sources making it a considerable challenge to resist their lures. Indicators of
quackery include the promise of quick cures, use of anecdotes and testimonials to support
claims, privileged power (only the great Dr. __ knows how to ) and secrecy
(claims are not open to objective scrutiny). William Jarvis (1990) suggests that some
professionals become quacks for the profit motive (making money) and the prophet motive
(enjoying adulation and discipleship resulting from a pretense of superiority).
Quackery and pseudoscience make use of propaganda strategies. Jacques Ellul (1965)
suggests that propaganda" is principally interested in shaping action and behavior with little
thought" (p. 278). A major function of propaganda is to squelch and censor dissenting points
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of view. Common propaganda methods include emotional reasoning, appeals to self interest,
censorship and questionable criteria discussed earlier (ad hominem attacks). The inflation of
knowledge claims (puffery) is a key propaganda strategy (Rank, 1984). Those who market
ideas attempt to forward a view, not through a balanced and accurate presentation of related
evidence and alternative views, but through reliance on strategies such as vague, emotional,
distorted presentations of disliked positions (see for example Todd, 1992), presentation only of
data that support a favored position, and question begging. The resultant harms of propaganda
in professional schools are varied and ripple out to others for decades.
This term refers to the intentional misrepresentation of the effect of certain actions
(e.g., taking a medicine to alleviate depression) to convince us to part with something of value
(e.g., our money). It involves deception and misrepresentation (Miller & Hersen, 1992).
Fraud is so extensive in some areas that consumers have formed national advocacy groups to
warn about bogus claims. Fraudulent claims (often appealing to the trappings of science) are
not without their effects; we may not discover effective methods, or we may be harmed by
remedies that are supposed to help.
Implications of valuing Criticism as a Route to Knowledge
If the route to knowledge is via criticism, what are the implications? Both students and
those who teach them must value truth over certainty, ignorance and prejudice, and clarity over
obscurity. They must value getting closer to the truth more than winning arguments and
maintaining social ranking. Karl Popper (1994) argues that relying on unexamined claims
about what is true reflects an arrogance that is at odds with a compassion for others. Valuing
~truth, the search for truth, the approximation to truth through the critical elimination of error,
and clarity" (Popper, p. 70) is needed to overcome the influence of other values (e.g.,
appearing profound through use of unintelligible language). Valuing truth over prejudice and
ignorance requires critical testing of claims and conclusions. Only through criticism can we
discover our errors. This is essential for learning how to do better in the future. A candid
recognition of and active search for mistakes would keep the inevitable uncertainty involved in
our work clearly in view and encourage us to keep track of our mistakes as a way to improve
services (Mcintyre & Popper, 1983). We must abandon a justification approach to knowledge
in which we search for support for our theories and instead use a falsification approach in
which we vigorously try to falsify our theories and actively search for avoidable mistakes
(Popper, 1972). Indicators of valuing truth over prejudice and certainty include a deep interest
in accurately understanding and presenting views, disliked as well as liked.
Valuing truth highlights the vast extent of our ignorance about the world. As Popper
(1992) notes, we all are equal in our vast ignorance. "It is important never to forget our
ignorance. We should therefore never pretend to know anything, and we should never use big
words. What I call the cardinal sin ... is simply talking hot air, professing a wisdom we do not
possess. " (p.86). We have "the obligation never to pose as a prophet" (I'. 206). Valuing
truth calls for making well-reasoned decisions--you can make a sound argument for them. For
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example, claims have survived risky predictions and are compatible with and informed by
empirical data describing relationships between behavior and specific environmental changes.
Critical discussion with oneself as well as with others is necessary for making well-informed
decisions and valuing truth over certainty, ignorance, and prejudice. We should cultivate the
intellectual attitudes of empathy, courage, curiosity, open-mindedness, and reliance on
standards such as clarity (Paul, 1993). Principles that Karl Popper highlights as the basis of
every rational discussion are as follows:
I. The principle of fallibility: perhaps 1 am wrong and perhaps you are right. But we
could easily both be wrong.
2. The principle of rational discussion: we want to try, as impersonally as possible, to
weigh up our reasons for and against a theory: a theory that is definite and
criticizable.
3. The principle of approximation to the truth: we can nearly always come closer to the
truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks. It can help us to achieve a better
understanding; even in those cases where we do not reach an agreement (Popper,
1992, p. 199).
Valuing truth over ignorance and prejudice requires basing decisions on data as well as theory
when necessary to solve problems. Guesses about the causes of problems should be checked
against data gathered in real life. For example, only by collecting detailed observational data in
real-life, problem-related settings may informed guesses be made about the causes of problem-
related behaviors and circumstances (see for example Carr, et aI., 1994). Collecting systematic
data concerning service outcomes provides a guide for decisions and allows us to discover
whether we are helping, harming, or having no effect. It allows clients to find out whether the
quality of their lives has improved, remained the same, or diminished. Anthony Flew (1985)
contends that the sincerity of our interest in helping clients is reflected in the efforts we make to
find out whether we do help them. Compassion for the trouble of others requires finding out if
we did help.
Differences between teaching and learning as opposed to indoctrination highlight the
emphasis on criticism in the former and authority in the latter (Gambrill, 1997a and b).
Teaching and learning require critically reviewing alternative views on subjects discussed, and
accurately describing opposing points of view in their strongest form. Knowledge is viewed as
tentative, ambiguous, and hard to get. Students as well as instructors are critically reflective
(not just reflective) and reasonable. Discordant points of view have a quite different fate in
teaching and learning compared with indoctrination. They are welcomed in the former and
punished or censored in the latter. Ethical rules suggested by Clark Kerr (1989) as inherent in
the creation and distribution of knowledge .include the careful collection and use of evidence,
including the search for" inconvenient facts," as in the process of attempted "falsification"; the
honest and careful use of the ideas and the work of others; the obligation to be skeptical; an
openness to alternative explanations; separating personal evaluation based on moral values from
the presentation of evidence and analysis; and, as a corollary, making explicit any personal
evaluations.
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We should hire instructors who value criticism over authoritarianism as a route to
knowledge. (A form for exploring the degree to which instructors encourage critical thinking
can be found in Critical thinking for social workers: A workbook, Gibbs & Gambrill, 1996.)
Students should be accurately informed about what science is and what it is not and how it
differs from pseudoscience and quackery and from authoritarianism in considering knowledge
claims. They should understand the limitations and negative consequences (e.g., inflated
claims of knowledge) of a justification (inductive) approach to knowledge. Valuing truth over
prejudice and certainty requires us to blow the whistle on puffery and on power plays disguised
as concerned criticism. Examples include claims based on criteria that do not allow us to
falsify guesses about what may be true or false. One of the important contributions of
academics is the preparation of up-to-date critical reviews of the evidence related to alternative
views concerning a topic. These are of value not only to other scholars and researchers, but to
professionals and policy makers as well. One indicator of quality is inclusion of critical
information about each study reviewed (e.g., sample sizes, reliability and validity of measures
used). The Cochrane Collaboration headquartered in Oxford, England is an important
resource. The purpose of this collaboration is to identify and to review all controlled
experimental trials related to a particular claim and to prepare definitive reviews (see, for
example, Enkin, Keirse, Renfrew, & Neilson, 1995). A bill of rights for the readers of
professional and academic journals should be drawn up. This would include the right to clear
(rather than obscure) writing and rigorous critical appraisal of the evidence related to competing
points of view concerning topics discussed. Students should be conversant with limitations of
different kinds knowledge claims and data collection methods and learn about the political,
economic, and social influences on the professions (Abbott, 1988; Friedson, 1986; Goode,
1960; Margolin, 1997; Szasz, 1994).
Obstacles
Criticism may bring wrath from those criticized (see, for example, Kolata, 1997).
Some argue that the universities within which professional schools are based have abandoned
their goals of teaching and learning for one of certification (Barzun, 1968; 1993). Some argue
that universities are the least likely places for knowledge to grow (Bartley, 1990) and the most
likely to adopt relativism (Gellner, 1992; Patai & Kortege, 1994). Students who present sound
arguments against popular views may be confronted by power plays from professors who make
pronouncements (claims with no arguments) that the student has seriously misread the literature
when in fact it is the professor who has seriously misread the literature. Neither professionals
nor researchers with reputations and funding to protect may be eager (let alone willing) to blow
the whistle on dubious classifications (e.g., attention deficit disorder) and intervention
programs (see for example, Dawes, 1994; McGuinness, 1989).
Superstition and pseudoscience abound in our everyday lives (see for example Burnham,
1987; Gardner, 1991; Gray, 1991). Critical thinking, writing, and reading take time and
protection from outside interruptions such as unpredictable noises as eloquently described by
Virginia Woolf in A room of one's own (1929). Writing takes time, and requires asking, "Is
this word necessary? Is this word clear? Is this the best word?" Where is this peaceful time to
come from? The first decision we have to make is whether we want to read, write, and think,
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critically. If the a~wer is yes, we must plan how to do so (e.g., scale down the number of
projects we work on). We can m~e maximal use of precious high-quality reading time by
choosing the very best minds to sample. The scholar's job is to hover over the enormous
quantity of written material searching for the very best, the gems. '
Summary
Thinking about knowledge and how to get it is a subject of vital interest. We can draw·
on the hard work and clear writing of philosophers such as Gellner, Mum, and Popper to
critically appraise different perspectives (e.g., relativism and reason) and to maximize the
likelihood of contributing to the growth of knowledge that helps clients minimize problems they
confront. We are more likely to contribute to the growth of knowledge if we do not seek
utopian goals, but, as Sir Karl Popper suggests, try to minimize avoidable miseries. A focus
on minimizing avoidable miseries should help us to have the courage and integrity to challenge
puffery, avoid propagandistic appeals, and value truth over winning arguments. It will provide
the pleasures of pursuing answers to questions that make a difference in the lives of others.
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